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Abstract
In this paper we assess the impact of unexpected shocks to real interest rates and GDP
on government budgets for nine European Union countries. Shocks are estimated as one-
step-ahead forecast errors arising from a recursive bivariate VAR model. To assess the
impact on the budgets we use available information on budgetary sensitivities with respect to
the business cycle and estimate the sensitivities to changes in interest rates on the basis of the
maturity structure of public debts. Our analysis is relevant, in particular, to define what
safety margins are needed to avoid the deficit exceeding the 3 per cent Maastricht threshold.
The approach followed in this paper differs in two respects from standard analyses aiming at
defining budgetary positions that satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact. First, whereas the
latter examine only fluctuations in economic activity, we also consider fluctuations in
interest rates. Second, whereas standard analyses focus on deviations from trends and define
margins for the medium-term cyclically adjusted balance, we examine unexpected shocks
and define margins for nominal balances. The results point to significant differences in the
required margins across countries, depending on the amplitude of past shocks, the magnitude
of automatic stabilizers and the size and maturity structure of the debt. In the case of Italy,
the country with the highest debt/GDP ratio and the largest fraction of short-term debt, the
impact of unexpected shocks to interest rates may be quite substantial. However, when
shocks to interest rates and GDP are considered jointly, other countries (Belgium and
Finland) seem to require larger margins.
JEL classification: H60, C53.
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1
The literature on the appropriate targets for government budget deficits within the
EMU framework has grown rapidly in recent years. Most studies has attempted to assess the
safety margins for the balance that would allow Member States to leave automatic stabilizers
to operate during normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the deficit below 3 per cent of
GDP.
2  These margins are often termed “minimal benchmarks” as they do not take into
account other sources of variability and uncertainty in the budgets.
A basic reference is the work of Buti, Franco and Ongena (1997), which examines past
episodes of recession in the European economies. The results of the study suggest that for
most economies a budget balance between zero and 1 per cent of GDP would satisfy the
minimal requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), while some Nordic countries
should aim for a balanced budget or a surplus. Other studies, based on stochastic simulations
of different models, tend to be less restrictive, suggesting deficits around 1 per cent of GDP
would be suitable for almost all countries in the EMU (Barrel and Pina, 2002; Barrel, Hurst
and Pina, 2003
3; Dalsgaard and de Serres, 1999
4).
Minimal benchmarks have been used by the European Commission when assessing the
stability and convergence programmes. They were first calculated in 1998-99 in connection
with the first set of programmes (European Commission, 1999). They were "obtained by
multiplying the budgetary sensitivity to the cycle with an output gap estimate which
encapsulates the size and frequency of cyclical fluctuations in output for each Member State"
                                                          
1 We wish to thank the National Central Banks of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain and the UK for providing us with data on public debt maturity.
2 The analysis of the fiscal framework provided by EMU has not been limited to just assessing
appropriate safety margins. For example, Marin (2002) discusses a fiscal policy rule that is consistent with the
legal provisions of budgetary discipline in EMU in both deterministic and stochastic environments.
3 In Barrel and Pina (2002) and in Barrel, Hurst and Pina (2003) estimates of safety margins are derived
from stochastic simulations of the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM).
4  Dalsgaard and de Serres (1999) derive estimates of cyclically-adjusted budget balances needed to avoid
breaching the 3 per cent limit from stochastic simulations of three disturbances: aggregate supply shocks, real
demand shocks and nominal shocks. These disturbances and their impact on fiscal balances are estimated with
a structural VAR model. The safety margins depend on the frequency of fiscal adjustments and the desired
degree of confidence.8
(European Commission, 2000, p. 51).
5 Revised estimates, presented in European
Commission (2000 and 2002), took into account new assessments of the budgetary
sensitivities and cyclical fluctuations.
These evaluations, while differing in a number of technical aspects, share the
following features: i) they focus on the budgetary risks arising from fluctuations in economic
activity; ii) they define these fluctuations with reference to some kind of normal (or trend)
trajectory of the economy; iii) they calculate safety margins which help to identify an
appropriate target for the cyclically adjusted balance and are meant to offset the budgetary
effects of the trough of a full business cycle.
In this paper we extend the assessment to include the budgetary risks coming from
fluctuations in interest rates, as in many countries of the Monetary Union interest payments
are an important part of the budget and can vary significantly in response these fluctuations.
6
Our analysis differs from the studies mentioned also in its definition of budgetary risks: for
both GDP and interest rates, we analyze the short-term impact on the budget of unexpected
shocks, obtained as forecast errors from a VAR model. Therefore, the safety margins that we
calculate refer to nominal balances and are meant to cope with the risk arising from errors in
forecasts of GDP and interest rates when budgeting for the following year.
Our safety margins are relevant for at least two reasons: the first rests on the current
difficulties of the SGP; the second is valid even if, or when, all EMU countries reach the
SGP target of a balanced cyclically adjusted balance.
As to the first reason, it now appears that the transition phase to a balanced cyclically
adjusted balance may be rather long, at least for the three largest economies of the Monetary
Union and Portugal. For these countries, the political and financial sanctions for breaching
                                                          
5  A similar approach is adopted in OECD (1997) and in IMF (1998).
6  In doing so we partly fulfil the need to extend the analysis of risks to other factors, as stated in the Code
of Conduct endorsed by the Ecofin Council in July 2001: "The medium-term budgetary position which respects
the close-to-balance-or-in-surplus rule of the SGP has to take account of several elements, such as the
possibility to deal with adverse cyclical developments and other unforeseen risks whilst respecting the
government deficit reference value, the need to take account of other sources of variability and uncertainty in
budgets, and the need to ensure a rapid decline in high debt ratios...".9
the 3 per cent deficit threshold make it advisable to include a margin in the budget to reduce
the risk of overshooting.
As to the second reason, it should be stressed that respecting the minimal benchmarks
or even maintaining a balanced cyclically adjusted balance are not foolproof guarantees that
the 3 per cent threshold will never be exceeded. They offer a full guarantee with regular
fluctuations, when the cyclical position of the economy can be unambiguously identified.
However, the debate on the nature of economic cycles suggests we should be rather cautious
about the possibility of accurately identifying cyclical fluctuations and trends (among others,
see Canova, 1998). If this is the case, at least with some of the methodologies currently used
to assess cyclical positions
7 there is still some likelihood of exceeding the 3 per cent
threshold while maintaining a balanced cyclically adjusted balance. If a government is
strongly averse to the risk of exceeding the threshold, then when budgeting for the following
year it may wish to maintain a margin to cope with forecast errors, independently of its
assessment of the cyclical position of the economy.
In this second context, our safety margin can be thought of as an additional constraint
on budgetary policies which provides a safeguard against serious failings in the assessment
of cyclical positions. The short-term horizon used to define the forecast errors (one year
ahead) and the usually limited role of  interest rates (apart from the case of Italy) imply that,
ceteris paribus, the margin is smaller than those found in the studies based on cyclical
fluctuations, and will therefore be binding only under special circumstances.
In what follows we evaluate the appropriate margins to cope with both interest rate and
GDP unexpected shocks for nine EU countries. The paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we estimate the unexpected shocks registered in the past as forecast errors
arising from a bivariate VAR model that includes the short-term real interest rate and the
logarithm of the real GDP. We then identify for all countries upper-bound estimates of future
unexpected shocks to these variables. To take into account the presence of the new monetary
policy regime, common upper-bound estimates for future unexpected shocks to the interest
                                                          
7 Especially those which either do not place restrictions on the length of economic cycles or allow them to
be relatively long.10
rate are obtained by averaging out the values calculated for the individual euro area
countries.
Section 3 examines the maturity structure of the debt of the individual countries.
Section 4 uses this information to assess the impact on the interest expenditures of future
shocks to interest rates. Section 5 evaluates the impact on the primary balance of future
shocks to GDP, using estimates of the sensitivities computed by the OECD, the European
Commission and, within the European System of Central Banks, by Bouthevillain et al.
(2001). The results obtained in the previous two sections are put together in Section 6 to
compute the overall safety margins needed to cope with future shocks to GDP and interest
rates. Section 7 concludes.
2. Estimating the unexpected shocks
Our assessment of upper-bound values for future unanticipated changes in the short-
term interest rates and in the GDP hinges on the shocks, estimated as forecast errors, that
occurred to these variables in the past.
8
In order to identify the shocks we need to specify how forecasts of interest rates and
GDP are carried out. In this paper we assume that governments base their assessments of
future developments only on the information conveyed by the past behaviour of these two
variables. In particular, forecasts are based on a vector auto-regressive (VAR) model which
includes only the real short-term interest rate and the real GDP.
9
We use real variables for two reasons. On one hand, we expect inflation in the future to
be much lower and less volatile than it has been in the past, particularly in the 1970s and
1980s. Therefore, including nominal variables in the VAR regression may yield estimates of
the shocks that are not suitable to forecast. On the other hand, the overall effect of inflation
                                                          
8 The analysis of forecast errors in fiscal policy analysis is not new. Artis and Buti (2001), drawing on the
work of Artis and Marcellino (1999), evaluate the random component of the budget through the difference
between fiscal forecasts and outturns.
9  We add a linear trend to the VAR because of the presence of the GDP.11
on the budget tends to be small.
10 We exclude from the VAR the long-term interest rate
because for some countries and periods it is significantly correlated with the short-term rate.
Hence, we prefer to compute changes in the long-term rate on the basis of the estimated
shocks to the short-term interest rate and a standard theoretical relationship between the two
rates.
We perform a recursive procedure based on a constant estimation window that moves
forward period by period.
11 The length of the estimation window is ten years; the frequency
of the data is quarterly. This implies that a first VAR is estimated for the first ten years of the
sample, i.e. the first forty observations, and a forecast is computed for the first out-of-sample
period on the basis of the estimated VAR parameters. The difference between this forecast
and the actual value represents the first forecast error. Another VAR is then estimated for a
ten-year sample obtained by extending forward the previous sample by one quarter and
dropping the first observation, and so on.
Let Y denote a generic variable (or vector of variables). The shock for period T+1 to Y
is set equal to the one-step-ahead forecast error of the VAR estimation up to time T. That is:
(1) ) 1 ( 1 1 T T T Y Y fe − = + +
where ) / ( ) 1 ( 1 T T T T I Y E Y + =  and  T I  is the information set at time T.
The estimated counterpart of the forecast error when using a VAR model is obtained
by replacing  ) 1 ( T Y  with its estimate:
(2) p T p T T T Y A Y A Y A Y − − + + + + = ˆ ... ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
1 2 1 υ
where  p  is the lag length.
We limit the lag length of the estimated VAR model to two since a preliminary
analysis based on a battery of tests indicates that this structure is sufficient to achieve
                                                          
10 Inflation affects the budget negatively via interest payments and positively via tax components. The
negative and positive effects of inflation tend to counterbalance.
11 A similar approach is followed by Bohn (1990) and Missale (1999).12
uncorrelated residuals.
12 The residuals do not turn out to be normally distributed for all
countries, however, mainly because of the presence of several outliers. We could include
dummies to take such exceptional events into account but we decided not to because our aim
is to estimate shocks so as to contain such events, provided they are unexpected.
Our sample consists of nine European Union countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) for which data are
available for a reasonable number of years. The sample covers the period 1978 (first quarter)
- 2001 (last quarter). This implies that the first VAR is estimated over the period 1978-1987
and the forecast errors we examine refer to the last fourteen years (1988-2001). Data on the
interest rate are taken from the Bank of Italy data set and refer to the three-month inter bank
rates for all countries but Italy, for which we use the average rate on (three-month, six-
month, one-year) Treasury Bills. GDP data are from national accounts.
13
For the purposes of the analysis that follows we take annual averages of the estimated
quarterly shocks. Each shock measures the difference between the expected value of the
variable, given the information available at the end of the previous quarter, and its
realization. Therefore, by considering the annual averages of such shocks we are implicitly
making the assumption that during each fiscal year policy-makers are able to revise their
forecasts and correct the budgetary trends of the following quarters. However, the
adjustment cannot make up for the budgetary effects of the forecast errors in the previous
quarters.
14
                                                          
12  For each VAR estimation we have calculated a Portmanteau statistic and an F-test for autocorrelation.
The statistics do not indicate the presence of autocorrelation at 1 per cent significance level for any country and
any estimation window, with the exception of very few cases.
13 GDP data are expressed according to ESA95. Series for Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain have
been reconstructed for the first few years on the basis of the rate of growth of GDP expressed according to
ESA79.
14  In this way we are able, albeit in a rather ad hoc manner, to account for the fact that policy-makers are
not completely constrained by the choices made when budgeting at the beginning of the fiscal year. In fact, our
framework allows for budgetary adjustments when quarterly information becomes available. The adjustments,
however, can only be partial, as they concern just the action to be taken in future quarters.13
A graph of the annualized shocks estimated for each country is provided in the
appendix. The mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values of the
annualized unexpected shocks are reported in Table 1.
Table 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE UNEXPECTED SHOCKS TO GDP AND
THE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE




min max Mean std.
Dev.
min max
Austria 0.094 0.568 -1.040 1.270 -0.213 1.519 -3.892 2.878
Belgium -0.079 0.666 -1.692 1.570 -0.582 1.644 -3.554 4.099
Finland -0.056 1.144 -3.696 1.487 -0.314 2.300 -7.507 4.522
Finland (1) 0.173 0.787 -2.103 1.487 -0.387 2.249 -7.507 3.965
France -0.157 0.411 -0.767 0.620 -0.821 1.979 -6.705 2.882
Germany -0.080 0.628 -1.588 1.355 -0.354 1.592 -3.910 2.741
Italy -0.082 0.463 -1.289 0.743 -1.363 1.970 -8.070 3.848
The Netherlands -0.091 0.425 -1.212 0.645 -1.181 1.263 -4.844 1.309
Spain -0.058 0.724 -2.152 1.171 -0.904 1.902 -6.319 3.236
euro area countries (2) -0.090 0.554 -1.407 1.017 -0.761 1.775 -5.687 3.034
UK -0.017 0.126 -0.429 0.162 -0.081 0.693 -2.476 0.960
(1) Unexpected shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded. – (2) Unweighted average of  the countries of the area
included in the sample. For Finland, statistics based on all estimated shocks are used.
For the euro area (defined here as the set of countries of the area included in our
sample), the standard deviation of the GDP shocks is equal to 0.6 points. The country with
the lowest standard error of the GDP shocks (0.1 percentage points) is the UK; the country
with the highest is Finland (1.1 percentage points including all observations and 0.8 if
shocks in 1991 and in 1992 are excluded).
The statistics for Finland based on the entire set of estimated shocks to GDP are
appropriate to define the safety margins required to cope with the risk of exceeding a given
budgetary threshold, irrespective of the severity of the recession. The use of the restricted
set, instead, is more appropriate when the concern is to avoid the sanctions of the Stability14
and Growth Pact. According to the Pact
15, there is no "excessive deficit" - therefore no basis
for imposing sanctions - in a given year if the 3 per cent deficit threshold is exceeded as a
result of a fall in real GDP of at least 2 per cent. In 1991 and in 1992, Finnish GDP fell by
6.3 and 3.3 per cent respectively.
16 In the restricted set we exclude the GDP shocks in those
years as it is very likely that the severe recession, which prevents sanctions being imposed, is
also the cause of the large forecast errors. While, in principle, the exceptional circumstances
may have also affected forecast errors on interest rates, the differences between the restricted
and the unrestricted statistics are relatively small and only the latter are used in our analysis.
The maximum negative unexpected shock to GDP lies between -0.4, in the case of the
UK, and -3.7 (-2.1, excluding 1991 and 1992) in the case of Finland. It is equal to -1.4 on
average for the euro area as a whole.
The standard error of the unexpected shocks to the short-term interest rate is equal to
1.8 on average for the euro area. It ranges from 0.7 (UK) to 2.3 (Finland). The maximum
positive unexpected shock is equal to 3.0 percentage points in the average of the euro area. It
lies between 1.0 points (UK) and 4.5 (Finland).
The results for Finland and the UK for both GDP and interest rate statistics are mainly
driven by the volatility of GDP and interest rate processes observed in these countries in the
period 1988-2001: particularly low in the case of the latter and high in the case of the former.
2.1  Upper-bound estimates of future shocks
The limited number of years for which we estimate forecast errors
17 seriously limits
the type of  statistical analysis we can perform. The limitations also apply to the criteria we
can use to assess upper-bounds for future shocks, relevant to define budgetary safety
                                                          
15  Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 "on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive
deficit procedure".
16  Over the period in which unexpected shocks are estimated only in Finland did GDP decline by more
than 2 per cent.
17  Even if it were feasible, extending backward the number of observations may not be appropriate, as
more distant past episodes may not be relevant for assessing future shocks.15
margins. In view of the fact that our analysis seems especially appropriate for very risk
averse governments, we have selected two particularly cautious criteria.
Under the first criterion, the upper-bound value of future shocks is equal to twice the
standard deviation of past shocks. With normally distributed phenomena it should
approximately exclude a subset of extreme positive (for interest rate) and negative (for GDP)
outcomes with probability equal to 2.5 per cent.
18 Under the second criterion, the estimate is
equal, instead, to "the worst outcome" recorded in the sample. This means selecting the
minimum value of the forecast errors for the GDP and the maximum for the interest rate.
19
The two criteria tend to produce similar results: a relatively large difference emerges
only for Finland when all shocks are included.
The minimum benchmarks proposed by the European Commission, while differing in
a number of aspects, are broadly based on the same kind of statistics. In European
Commission (2002), the safety margins are computed by multiplying the budgetary
sensitivity to the cycle by an output gap estimate, which is obtained as the simple average of
the two worst outcomes among: (a) the largest negative output gap recorded in the Member
State between 1980 and 2000; (b) the unweighted average of the largest negative output gaps
in EU Member States over the period 1980-2000; (c) the volatility of the output gap in the
Member State, as measured by two times the standard deviation.
To evaluate the impact of changes in the short-term interest rate on interest
expenditure, and hence on the budget balance, it is important to assess their effect on long-
term interest rates. To this end we use the relationship between the short-term and the long-
term interest rate implied by the "expectation theory" of the term structure:
                                                          
18  Because it was decided not to include dummies for exceptional events, normality is not respected for
both GDP and interest rate shocks in the case of the UK and for GDP shocks only in the case of  Finland and
France.
19  Notice that, as far as the interest rate is concerned, for all countries with the exception of Belgium the
maximum shock is lower than twice the standard deviation. This seems in contrast with the non normality of
the VAR residuals, which was previously attributed to the presence of outliers. However, the non normality
affects more the quarterly shocks than their annual averages, used in this paper to assess the impact of interest
rate shocks on the budget. Moreover, outliers are mainly represented by large negative values.16
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where  h t i ,  is the interest rate at time t on an h-period bond and  1 , i t
e i +  is the expected short-
term interest rate at time  i t + .
Since, in this paper, expectations are assumed to be formed according to the VAR
model, we use the estimated coefficients to calculate the forecasts at time t for the short-
term interest rate  1 + t , 2 + t , …,  1 − + h t  steps ahead. Given the relationship between short-
term and long-term interest rates assumed above, the change in the long-term interest rate
induced by a 1 per cent shock occurring at time t to the short-term interest rate is given by
the cumulated sum of the impulse responses of the short-term interest rate to its own shock
divided by h.
As long-term bonds typically have ten-year maturity in most of the countries
considered in this study, we set h equal to ten. The cumulated response to a 1 per cent
interest rate shock varies significantly across countries. However, the impact of a 1 per cent
change in the short-term interest rate on the long-term rate is in all cases very small, ranging
from 0.008 percentage points for the Netherlands to 0.139 percentage points for Austria.
20
3. Maturity structure of public debts
The direct impact of a change in interest rates on interest expenditure and hence on the
government budget balance depends on the size and the maturity structure of the debt. To
evaluate this impact for our sample of nine EU countries we use data on the debt structure
provided by the national central banks. The information generally regards (i) debt with
residual maturity below one year and other variable interest rate instruments (short-
maturity); (ii) debt with residual maturity between one and five years (medium-maturity);
(iii) debt with residual maturity above five years (long-maturity debt). For most countries,
figures are obtained by extrapolating to general government debt information available for
                                                          
20  The change in the long-term interest rate induced by a 1 per cent shock to the short-term rate is
estimated to be equal to 0.139, 0.042, 0.023, 0.013, 0.038, 0.036, 0.008, 0.060, 0.032 percentage points in
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, respectively.17
central government debt only, which, however, accounts in all countries for a large fraction
of total debt. Within the sample, information on the amounts of variable interest rate debt is
available only for Finland, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. For all the remaining
countries we assume that no variable interest rate instruments exist. This hypothesis should
not affect the results significantly, as in all cases the fraction of indexed debt is likely to be
very small (evidence up to 1995 is coherent with this assumption and is shown in Missale,
1999) . Figures reported in Table 2 are based on these data.
Table 2
MATURITY STRUCTURE OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT GROSS DEBT IN 2001
(as a percentage of GDP) (1)
Residual maturity AUS BEL FIN FRA GER ITA NDL SPA UK
Below 1 year and variable
interest rate instruments
5.5 18.2 15.1 16.3 11.3 39.9 10.9 10.7 13.0
of which: short-term debt (2) 2.8 11.4 12.0 6.2 4.4 23.3 3.9 6.9 10.4
Between 1 and 5 years
(excluding var. rate instr.s)
25.6 40.1 14.7 17.1 23.7 33.8 19.2 20.9 7.0
Above 5 years (excluding
var. rate instr.s)
30.5 49.4 13.8 23.7 24.5 35.6 22.9 25.6 19.0
Total debt 61.6 107.7 43.6 57.1 59.5 109.3 53.0 57.2 39.0
(1) Data for Austria are constructed applying the maturity structure of 1999 debt to total debt in 2001. – (2)
Debt with initial maturity below 1 year and variable instruments. Given the lack of information for Austria, we
assume that one half of the debt with residual maturity below 1 year is made of short-term instruments.
In the exercises that follow we assume that debt comes evenly to maturity.
21
Based on these assumptions, the estimate of the sensitivity of the interest expenditure
to changes in the interest rate cannot be precise. Nonetheless, as the focus of our analysis is18
to estimate safe budgetary positions, which are expressed as a percentage of GDP, the
approximation can be considered satisfactory.
In Table 3 we report for all countries the estimated impact of a 1 per cent increase in
interest rates on all maturities (i.e. a parallel shift of the whole yield curve). This exercise
allows us to compare the relative sensitivity of interest payments to interest rate shocks
across countries. Italy exhibits the highest overall sensitivity, Austria the lowest.
Table 3
CHANGE IN INTEREST EXPENDITURE INDUCED BY A ONE PER CENT
INCREASE IN THE INTEREST RATE (FOR ALL MATURITIES)
(as a percentage of GDP)
AUS BEL FIN FRA GER ITA NDL SPA UK
1st year 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.07
4. Safety margins against shocks to interest rates
In this section we calculate the effects on interest expenditure of the upper-bound
estimates for future shocks to short-term interest rates calculated in Section 2, also taking
into account their impact on long-term rates. The hypotheses on debt composition by
instruments and residual maturity are the same as in Section 3. However, since here we
envisage different shocks for the short-term and the long-term interest rate, additional
assumptions must be made to match each type of debt to the appropriate rate.
We suppose that the amount of bonds with a residual maturity below one year that are
not short-term are all long-term bonds with a ten-year life. We also assume that maturing
debt is rolled over with bonds of the same category.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
21  From this assumption it follows that the impact on expenditure in the first year is as if one-half of the
debt with residual maturity below one year and variable interest rate debt were renewed at the beginning of the
year at the new interest rate.19
The first upper-bound estimate of the future positive shocks to the short-term interest
rate is equal to twice the standard deviation of the past forecast errors. The second estimate
is equal to the maximum positive forecast error. The shocks to the long-term interest rate are
computed multiplying the country-specific coefficient presented in Section 2 (footnote 20)
by the relative shock to the short-term rate.
In view of the common monetary policy, we assume that the same shock to the interest
rate will hit all euro area countries. Therefore, for these economies we use common upper-
bound estimates for future shocks on interest rates, obtained by averaging out the values
computed for the individual countries. For the UK we use the information stemming from its
country-specific shocks.
Table 4
SAFETY MARGINS AGAINST FUTURE INTEREST RATES SHOCKS








The Netherlands 0.132 0.113
Spain 0.158 0.135
euro area countries (1) 0.223 0.190
UK 0.081 0.056
(1) Unweighted average of  the countries of the area included in the sample.
The impact on interest expenditures of shocks to interest rates equal to our upper-
bound estimates is reported in Table 4.
22 Owing to the size and the maturity structure of its
                                                          
22  The information on the maturity structure that we show in Table 2 allows us, with few additional
assumptions, to compute the impact of shocks to interest rates on expenditure also in the second and subsequent
years. In view of the purpose of this paper we do not present the results here. However, they are available on
request.20
public debt, Italy is the country in which the impact of the shocks is largest under both
criteria. The impact is smallest in Austria under the first criterion and in the UK under the
“maximum shock” criterion.
The result obtained for the UK is attributable to the relatively low variability of interest
rates compared to that observed on average in the euro area. In fact, owing to the maturity
structure of its public debt, the UK does not exhibit a particularly low sensitivity of
government expenditure to shocks to the interest rates (Table 3).
5. Safety margins against shocks to GDP
In this section we compute fluctuation bands for the primary budget balance using the
analysis of unexpected GDP shocks presented in Section 2 and the estimates of the
sensitivities of the primary balance to the business cycle computed by the OECD, the
European Commission (EC) and, within the European System of Central Banks, by
Bouthevillain et al. (2001). The differences of the estimates for each country across
institutions are usually small (Table 5).
Table 5
SENSITIVITIES OF THE PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCES TO THE BUSINESS
CYCLE
ESCB OECD EC
Austria 0.47 0.31 0.30
Belgium 0.56 0.61 0.65
Finland 0.55 0.64 0.65
France 0.53 0.42 0.45
Germany 0.45 0.51 0.50
Italy 0.48 0.48 0.40
The Netherlands 0.69 0.64 0.85
Spain 0.40 0.40 0.40
UK 0.65 0.50 0.45
Source: Bouthevillan et al. (2001).21
The sensitivity of the budget balance (as a ratio to GDP) with respect to output
measures the change in the budget balance due to a 1 per cent change in real GDP. It is given
by the following semi-elasticity:
(4)







For each country, in Table 6 we present the impact on the budget of shocks to GDP of
a size corresponding to the two criteria described in Section 2: twice the standard deviation
of the forecast errors; the minimum of the past forecast errors.
Table 6
SAFETY MARGINS AGAINST GDP SHOCKS
(as a percentage of GDP)
ESCB OECD EC
2*std.dev. min 2*std.dev. min 2*std.dev. min
Austria -0.534 -0.489 -0.352 -0.322 -0.341 -0.312
Belgium -0.746 -0.947 -0.813 -1.032 -0.866 -1.100
Finland -1.259 -2.033 -1.465 -2.365 -1.488 -2.402
Finland (1) -0.866 -1.156 -1.008 -1.346 -1.024 -1.367
France -0.435 -0.407 -0.345 -0.322 -0.370 -0.345
Germany -0.565 -0.715 -0.640 -0.810 -0.628 -0.794
Italy -0.444 -0.619 -0.444 -0.619 -0.370 -0.516
The Netherlands -0.586 -0.836 -0.544 -0.776 -0.722 -1.030
Spain -0.579 -0.861 -0.579 -0.861 -0.579 -0.861
euro area countries (2) -0.644 -0.863 -0.648 -0.888 -0.670 -0.920
UK -0.164 -0.279 -0.126 -0.214 -0.114 -0.193
(1) Unexpected shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded. – (2) Unweighted average of  the countries of the area
included in the sample. For Finland, statistics based on all estimated shocks are used.
Using all estimates of budgetary sensitivities and criteria to identify the size of the
shock, the UK is the country in which the safety margins for the primary balance are
smallest, notwithstanding the relatively high sensitivity of the primary balance to the
business cycle, and Finland is the country in which they are largest as a consequence of
above average budget sensitivity and the size of the upper-bound values for future shocks to
the output, which are the largest in the sample (this remains true even when 1991 and 1992
unexpected GDP shocks are excluded). With the sensitivities estimated by Bouthevillain et22
al. (2001), in all remaining countries the safety margins range between 0.4 and 0.7
percentage points of GDP under the first criterion and between 0.4 and 0.9 under the second.
6. Safety margins against simultaneous shocks to GDP and interest rates
In the previous sections we evaluated separately the impact of shocks to interest rates
and GDP on interest expenditure and primary balance, respectively. We now combine the
two analyses and provide what we consider prudential safety margins for the overall budget
balance.
A cautious approach to budgetary targeting would require the setting of safety margins
that can avoid overshooting a given threshold in a scenario in which unfavourable shocks to
output and interest rates occur simultaneously. In practice, this means adding up the margin
on the primary budget balance and that on the interest expenditure. Following this approach,
in Table 7 we report the overall fluctuation in the budget under the two criteria for the
shocks. For the primary balance we refer to the estimates of the sensitivities presented in
Bouthevillain et al. (2001).
When future shocks are set equal to twice the standard deviation of past occurrences,
the overall impact on the budget balance ranges from -0.2 per cent of GDP in the case of the
UK to -1.5 in the case of Finland  (-1.1, if the observations concerning unexpected GDP
shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded
23). Instead, if we consider the second criterion (i.e. the
greatest - in absolute terms - positive shock to interest rates and negative shock to GDP) the
impact lies between -0.3, in the case of the UK, and -2.2 in the case of Finland (-1,4, if the
observations concerning 1991 and 1992 are excluded). On average, the safety margin that we
estimate for the euro area countries is equal to 0.9 and 1.1 per cent of GDP, respectively,
according to the two criteria.
                                                          
23  As already mentioned, in our analysis future unexpected shocks to interest rates for individual euro area
countries are set equal to the area average to take account of the presence of the new monetary policy regime.
The average is computed using all Finnish forecast errors on interest rates, 1991 and 1992 errors included. The
impact of this decision is negligible.23
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The Netherlands -0.718 -0.949
Spain -0.737 -0.996
euro area countries (2) -0.864 -1.052
UK -0.245 -0.335
(1) Unexpected shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded. – (2) Unweighted average of
the countries of the area included in the sample. For Finland, statistics based on all
estimated shocks are used.
The estimates of the minimal safety margins presented in European Commission
(2002) differ significantly from those obtained in our analysis. This is not surprising, given
the large methodological differences between the two approaches. In particular, the estimates
of the Commission are higher for all countries, even though they refer to fluctuations in the
primary budget balance only. This result mainly reflects the fact that, as explained above,
our margins are meant to cope with errors in forecasting when budgeting for the following
year, while the margins calculated by the Commission are meant to offset the budgetary
impact of the trough of a full business cycle.
In the European Commission estimates as well, Finland is the country which needs the
highest margins (3.8 per cent of GDP); in Belgium and in the Netherlands the minimal safety
margin is estimated to be equal to 2.3 per cent of GDP. Elsewhere, safety margins are close
to the euro area average (1.6 per cent of GDP).
The results shown in Table 7 refer to the case in which unfavourable shocks to GDP
and interest rates occur simultaneously.24
An adequate evaluation of the safety margins would require an analysis of the
correlation between the shocks. In the first column of Table 8 we report the simple
correlation coefficient.
24 We also regress shocks to GDP on the shocks to the interest rate
and report the estimated coefficient in the second column of the table, together with its
probability value for all countries.
25 In fact, with the linear regression we are able to evaluate
the significance of the covariance between the two variables.
Table 8
CORRELATION BETWEEN GDP AND INTEREST RATE SHOCKS
simple regression coefficient
correlation value p-value
Austria 0.284 0.0042 0.0337
Belgium 0.165 0.0021 0.2256
Finland -0.161 -0.0021 0.2348
France -0.090 -0.0006 0.5109
Germany 0.378 0.0055 0.0041
Italy 0.045 0.0003 0.7424
The Netherlands 0.240 0.0023 0.0743
Spain -0.252 -0.0030 0.0612
UK 0.539 0.0036 0.0000
The linear regression coefficients for Germany and the UK turn out to be significant.
26
For those countries, therefore, ignoring the link between GDP and interest rate shocks would
lead to an incorrect assessment of the safety margins. The coefficients for both Germany and
the UK are positive, implying that when there is a slowdown in GDP interest rates are likely
to decline too, to some extent offsetting the impact on the budget balance of the negative
shock to output. Thus the safety margins reported in Table 8 for these countries are probably
too cautious. Belgium, Finland (we include all observations), France, and Italy present a low
simple correlation and the regression coefficient is non significant. Austria is a borderline
                                                          
24  The analysis of the correlations has been performed using country-specific shocks to both GDP and
interest rate.
25 When residuals are heteroschedastic, we use heteroschedasticity consistent standard error.
26  The p-value is lower than the significance level, here set at 1 per cent.25
case since the regression coefficient is positive and significant at 5 per cent but not at the 1
per cent level.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate the first year impact of unexpected shocks to interest rates
and GDP on government budgets in nine EU countries. Shocks which have occurred in the
past are estimated as forecast errors arising from a vector auto-regressive model which
includes two variables: the short-term real interest rate and the real GDP. On the basis of
these estimates we build up two scenarios for future forecasts errors and we calculate the
safety margins required to cope with them.
The first scenario assumes that shocks equal to twice the standard deviation of the
estimated forecast errors hit both GDP and interest rate simultaneously. In the second
scenario the “worst” estimated shocks for GDP and interest rate are assumed to occur at the
same time. As far as euro area countries are concerned, in both scenarios we focus on a
common interest rate shock, computed as a weighted average of the shocks estimated for
each individual country in the area. This allows us to take into account the presence of the
monetary union.
The results for the two scenarios are relatively similar. In the first scenario the required
safety margins, when budgeting for the following year, range between 0.2 percentage points
of GDP in the case of the UK (and, among the euro area countries, 0.6 points in the case of
Austria and France) and 1.5 points in the case of Finland (1.1 points if GDP unexpected
shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded). In the second scenario the margins range between
0.3 percentage points of GDP in the UK (0.6 points in Austria and France) and 2.2 points in
Finland, (1.4 points if GDP unexpected shocks in 1991 and 1992 are excluded). Italy should
aim at a margin of between 1.0 and 1.1 percentage points of GDP, depending on the
scenario.
Not surprisingly, in view of the short-term horizon used to define the forecast errors,
for all countries our estimates are lower than the safety margins for the medium-term
cyclically adjusted balance recently computed by the European Commission, even though
they refer to fluctuations in the primary budget balance only.26
To assess the probability that both unfavourable shocks to GDP and interest rate occur
at the same time, we performed an analysis of the correlation between the two shocks. In
most of the countries in our sample, shocks to GDP and interest rate appear not to be
significantly correlated. Our estimations of the margins should therefore be considered
appropriate according to prudential criteria. In Germany and in the UK the correlation is
significant and positive, suggesting that in these countries the margins estimated in this study
may be excessively large.Appendix
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